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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~rr ATE 0 t~, LT ~\ 11, 
Platuti.ff and Respo·nde-nt1 
--VS.-
) l_.:\ ( 'l\: J.-fERRif J 1-' RTV·E~~RITR.OJ I. ~JR. J 
and LEt))J"_._.\J-tl) \V -'\.R.NEJ{ BO.\\:r XE~ 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case Xo~ 
9089 
Brief of Appellant Bowne 
STAT·E~:IEN'l, 01~, FACTS 
On the :24-th day of August, 1958~ at approximately 
S ;00 p.m., LeRoy Joseph \.r erner vlas killcd4 The decedent. 
was an inmate at the l~tah State Prison, and the homicide 
occurred at the Prjson in the attic to Cell Block A~ ':rhe 
killing 1vas accornplished hy Mack Merrill Rivenburghr 
Jr. (R. ~ll~j; T. ~0~~ 553~ 604-613). There v,;-cre t\vo other 
inmates present in the attic at the tirne of the killing, 
Jesse :JL Garri a, J r4, and thP appellant in this tnattcr ~ 
Leonard \Varner Bo,·vne. 
Earlier that Jay, Itivenburglt had jnformed Bo\\~ne 
that he intended to perform an act of ~odotny '\·it h the 
decedent. He asked Bo,vne to ~erve as a lookout in the 
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. . . . .. 
attic· d~ri.ng the act of" perversion (R .. 269, 270, 319~ 503; 
r_l'~ 253,. 5~+-!JSG, 684, and 694). Because of fear1 ·which 
~o,vnc held for Rivenburgh, and the custom of the Prison, 
Bo,vne agreed to_ act a~ ~'poin~ man" during the act of 
s·odomy. I-'ursuant to· this," Rivenburgh secured some 
soiled e:~othing for B~v{n~ ·.0 ""~~ar in the d~sty ~ttic (R. 
50:~~ 504 ;_ ~--- 659 )~ Bov~.~~.e. changed into the s~iied el_oth~s, 
mP,.gled and. talked 'vit~t ~thcr iruuates i_n the cell bloc1-i 
(T .. ~29 and 695 ), and approxjmately one~ half hour later 
.entered the attic with Garcia. 
Bovlne and Garcia: were in the attic about ten minutes 
. . 
prior to the arrival of Rivenburgh and the decedent (T. 
C3~). ''{bile waiting they talked casually and srnokcd a 
eigarette. After Rivenburgh and the dacedent entered 
t.he attic, the decedent began to tmd re~ s j n preparation 
for the act of sodomy (T. 601 and 602) .. Tt V{as dark in 
t~te· attie~ Rivenburgh sp~ke to Bo\vne to make sure he 
and Ga.rGia were ~~on point,'' and to1rl Bowne to close the 
grat~ng Vlhich covered the IJlace or entry (R. 51~; T. 608~ 
G4lt and 698) .. 
I~O\\··ne removed his shoes so as to make less noise 
. . 
in crossing the metal deck of the atHc (T. 6~7 a~_d 698). 
As he passed b~y Rivenburgh he notirA;d the de~-edent un-
d t'es~ing and· also notic~d tha:t .1~-ivenhurgh 1vas holding a 
kr.Life 'vhich he frequcntl~v carri-ed (T. S36 and 837). 
Rivenburgh and the decedent \vere talking in an incon~ 
::-ipieiou~ tone, and Bo,vne did not pay any attention to 
'vhat 'va~ said (T. 699). 
. . 
\ Vltile Bo'\o\rne \ras adjusting the loose grating, he had 
his back to Rivenburgh and the decedent. Bowne~heard a 
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loud s(·r-c·n1n~ pounding on thP metal deck, and a great deal 
(1 r noi~e \\'hich ~l'l'ltH.'d to Indicate an intensiYC struggle 
bet1veen HivPnburgh and the decedent (T. 700 and 736). 
Rivenburgh eri~·d out. lie had lost his knife, and he asked 
llH' ~u\1 p in finding it. ( r1 1 .. 701; see also T4 607 and 611)4 
q ovL\t·ued by instinct and fear, Bo'\\yne opened a 
pocket-knife \Vhich he carried with him ( T. 701 and TO~) I 
l "pon quick refleeti on, l~o\\ .. ne closed the knife and re-
turned it to his poeket (T. 703). He fell on his }nl.-:l~ls 
and knees and attempted to find the knife lost hy Riven-
lnlrgh ( T. 701). In tlris position Bo,vne V{as severely en t 
in the upper portion of his leg, although at no time did 
i1e join the struggle or muke an)~ ph·ysi cal contact \vi lh 
the decedent { T. 704). 'Vhile looking for the knife, 
Bo,vne felt something 'val'tn and sticky \vhich later proved 
to be blood (T. 703 )~ 
Rivenburgh fled the scene; running to the oppo-
sitP end of the attic, he descended to the catwalk belo'\r. 
Garcia follo\\~ed J{i venburgh, and Bovm.e, after having 
some difficulty finding his shoes} came out of the attic 
last ( T~ 705). In the excitement, Bo,vne had gained pos-
~<.~ssion of two knives which he brought out of the attic 
(T~ 706 and 707).. · · 
The three \\'l th the help of other inmates cle.arted 
themselves, disposed of the bloody clothing, and estab-
lished ali bj s ( R. :2-JG~ 2G.S; T. 229-24:~~ 707 ~ 710). Son1etjme 
later J~owru_~ concluded that the decedent had been killed 
(T. 772). ~.:\ t no time did Bo\vne take part in any plait 
to kill the decedent, or entertain any intent to !rill {T~ G4~. 
645, 699~ 703-706, 710). ' 
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Of course there was rnucl1 conflicting evidence, and 
the ~tate 'vill rely Oil facts :::;onie'\vhat different than the 
essential clements we have set forth above. There \Vas 
testimony concerning a conversation betV~oTeen Rivenburgh 
and another jn1nate, Randel, \vhich took place on the 24th 
of August prior to the ho1nicide. l~o";rne ¥las present as 
the other tv{o iliscussed the druggerl C.Oilrlit.ion of the de-
cedent. The decedent, as "'""ell a~ the other in•nates in~ 
volved, including the \vitnesses for the State, had taken 
exef.~sive arnounts of amphetimine pills over a period 
of days prior to the homicide. During this conversation 
l{ivenburgh rernarkcd tltat ~omebody \Vas going to cut 
off the decedent's head if he continued to act as he had 
( R. 497 ; r_r ~ 221-223, and 691). rrh Is led 1 t i ven burgh and 
R.andel to a general discussion of various methods of 
homicide ( T. :245 and 246). Bovill e did not pay particular 
attention to \Vhat vir as said, since such talk 1vas co1nn1on 
}Jlace at the Prison (R .. 276-~78~ :2DG, 297, 497; T~ 691 and 
r \9.:2) . Indulging in a1nphetimine~ and ot 1te r drugs, po~­
sessing knive:.-:;, thrt~atcning death, and engaging in acts 
of sodon1y \\rcre not unusual act ivilies for inmates of the 
L~ta.h State PJ'isOTI at this ti tne------..-espec.ially Rivenburgh 
(R .. 233~~38, 281-283, 285-~SD, 4SS-495, 500, 501, 510; ~r. 
~51, ~~3.:!~ 609, and 610 ). 
(;arcia was tried 8eparately. Rivenburgh and the 
appellant Bo\vne 1vere tried jointly and convicted of 
•nurder in the first degree .. The detailed testirnor.y intro-
duced supports all of the~e facts.. ''T e \vill refer to the 
dc~tail~ of the testirr1ony as the·~· betou1e applir.able in 
.stating out· argument~. 
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POINT I. 
f'TA.H COD.8"' A~..VN. § 77-30-2 (1953) IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL+ 
A. TliF. DEFENDA ~T Vl AS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IK THAT UT .. 4H CODE ANN. § ii-.30-2 (1953) IS 
VIOLATIVE OF' THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAll, ART. II§ 7~ 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.Z~JITED STATES, 
AMEND~ "'\IV+ 
ll. THE DEF.EI\'D.AKT \VAS DE~IED THE RIGHT 'TO 
A FAIR A~D I11PARTL-\.L JCRY IN THAT [.ITAH CODE 
A~v~v. ~ 7'7-30~'2 (195J) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE COtVSTITU-
TlON OF UTAHt ART~ I, § 12. 
C. THE DEFENDA)JT WAS DE~IED THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LA\VS TK THAT .[JTAH CODE A:.\~~v. 
§ 77-.J0-:2 (1953) IS VIOLATI""lE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED ST ... 4..T~'S, AMEND. XIV+ 
POINT IL 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
NOT GRANTING DEFEND .. ~NT~S !\'lOTION FOR A SEPA. 
RATE TRIAL~ 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DE-
FE~DANT'S J\.IOTION TO DlS}I11SS SIN·CE THE Jl~RY 
COULD NOT HAVE FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF I\·IUR-
DER. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S I~STRUCTION NO .. 15 IS CON-
FeSI~G AND IN ERROR RECAL~SE IT FAILS 'TO SEP~\· 
R~-\ TE THE CRIME OF SOD011Y FROM THE CRI:VIE OF 
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}fURDER, AND IN ITS ABSTRA·CT· FORA! COULD ALLOW 
THE JURY TO FIND THE DE.FENDANT GUILTY OF 
1\iURDER IF THEY BELIEVED HE AIDED AND ABETTED 
IN THE A-cT OF SODOMY. 
~ . 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT~S INSTRUCTION NO+ 26 IS IN 
J!.:RROR SINCE IT FAILS TO RESTRICT THE JURY TO A 
CONSIDERATION OF THE ADJ1.liSSIONS AND STIPULA· 
TIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE TRIAL-TO EACH 
RESPECTIVE PARTY. 
POINT VL 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO~ 13. 
. . 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL~ 
~ •. 
POINT VIII. 
· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO C01tlPEL 
T.HE PROSECUTIO~ TO FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS 
.AND· .COPIES OF STATEMENTS l\iADE BY WITNESSES 
AND DEFENDANTS~ 
POINT IX .. 
. .. . 
- .. ..... .. . 
TfiE TRIAL COURT ERRED WH~N IT REFUSED TO 
AD~IIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CHARACTER AND 
~ . - . . 
REPUTATION OF THE DECEASED . 
.. . - ... 
.. .. 
. . ..... . . .. 
... ·. ··~ .. · • • _. ·, • • •'. • I• I :..,..;'"' 
. ~ 
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POINT l. 
UTAH CODE A;VlV. § 7'1"-.'10-2 (1953) IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
A+ THE DEFENDANT \V..:\S DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW I~ THAT UTAH CODE f"L~•.llv'. § 77-90-2 (1953) IS 
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF U'TAH1 ART. 1,. § 7~ 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE Uh'ITED STATES. 
A.JfE1\rD+ XIV+ 
B. THE DEFENDA~T WAS DENIED THE RIGHT ITO 
A FAIR AND IIVIPARTIAL JL~RY IN THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-30-2 (1953) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITU~ 
TION OF liT AHJ ART. I~ § 12. 
C. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT ·UTAH CODE AlVl~l. 
§ 77~80-2 (1958) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTJ01.V 
OF THE UNITED STATES, AMEND. XIV .. 
l~tah Code Ann. =~ 7'1"-30-15 (1953)~ which allo\vs a 
person charged \Vi tl 1 a eri rne to exe rei se certain pe rernp-
tor~y challenges, reads as follows: 
HThe state and defendant shall each be al-
lo\ved the follo·w·ing num her of peremptory cha1~ 
Jrnge~: 
(a) Ten, if the offenf.!e charged is pillljs]lable 
by death. 
(b) Four, if the offense charged i8 a felony 
not punishahlP hy death. 
(c) Three, if the offense charged is a tnisde-
m-eanor.~' 
In the event of a joint triaL tb [s section js modified bY 
. w 
the provisions of l Ttah Code ... 4 nn. § 77-.10-2 (1953), Vlhich 
~tates: 
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~"If t-w·o or 1nore defendants are jointly tried 
they sha11 eollectively be allo1ved the number of 
p (~rem pt o ry c.ha 11 en ge s specified in section 7 7.30-
15 OTJly in case they join jn. ~uch collective chal-
lenges, but in addition to ~ u{·h challenges each 
defendant shall be allo"\ved the follo\ving number 
of perernptOIJ7 challenge~ "\\Thich may be separate-
] y exercised : 
(a) T"'\\'o, if the olTen~c cl1arged is punishable 
by death. 
(b) One, if the offense charged h~ not punish-
able by death.'~ 
The t\VO defendants in the irl~tant ease eould not 
agree upon the ten peren11)to•·:f challenges allo'\ved in 
section 7?-30&15 or any or thenl cr. 64 and 65 ). l-nder 
the ternls of section 77-30-2, each defendant \Vonld be en-
titled to exercise only t\vo pe ren1pto ry challenges. \\ · i th 
this in mind, the defendant Bo1vne conditionally agreed 
to the selections of defendant Rivenburg- in order that 
the defendant Rivenburg \\'ould not be denied his full 
llUlnbcr of percrnptury challenges { rp. 64 and 65). This 
\~·as done \Vith the approval or the trial jndge on the ex-
pres~ understanding that the defendant Bo,vne v.rould 
not thereby saer i [i(·e his objections to the section or 'vaive 
any right to appeal the question to this Court (T. 65). 
Since the defendant "\vas tried jointly and could not 
agree upon any of the challenges 'vi th the other defend-
ant~ he \vas re~tricted io only t"\\To peremptory challenges. 
Even a del'endant charged \Yith a misdemr.anor is entitled 
to t.h rc.~l~ J.lCTl~ ut pt o t·y (· hallengr~~- (} tah Code Au n. § 77-
.:i0-.15 (.1953). rl,o allo\r a defendant ''"ho is rltarged with 
an offt·nse puni~hable hy death only t-wo ~ueh challenges 
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is certainly unju~t, unfair, and violative of the due proc-
ess p1·ovisions of our L~onst i tn tions. z.-: tah C o·u-st., a.r t. I 1 ~ 
'7; Const .. , amend. XIV .. Such a l'esult violates our tradi~ 
tion al concepts of fair play and substantial justice, and 
denies the defendant a trial by a fair and impartial jury. 
li tah Const., art. I, ~ 1:2. 
This que~tion 'vas first raised in Utah in the case 
of People v .. O'La·ughlin, 3 T:tah 133, 1 Pac. 653 (1882). 
At that time Utah \va.s a territory~ but the statute in ques-
tion had the same effect as section 77~30-2. The court 
revie-..ved the argument of the counsel for the defense as 
folol\vs: 
~' [Counsel for the defense argued] that in 
criminal cases each defendant must plead for him-
self in person ; each makes a separ a.te is sue \vith 
the people on the question of his guilt. If con-
victed, each must suffer punishment for himself, 
or each n1ay be pardoned on his own merits. One 
can appeal "ri thout aff eeting an other. In all this, 
it is elaitned, tl1ere is a distinction between crimi-~ 
nal and civil cases. In a civil case one judgment 
only is recorded; one satisfaction pays for all; 
and the ref ore, in a criminal case the trial is nece s-
sarily separate, to a certain extent; in other 
''+ords, the \Vo rd 'party' as used in the statute, 
means each individual defendant.'~ (Id .. at 1 Pac. 
655) 
The court reje<:ted the defendant's argument that each 
defendant was entitled to exercise the full number of per-
emptories and held that the challenges had to be exer~ 
cised jointly. The reasoning behind this interpretation 
was stated as follows: 
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·t•Jiy the statu~e riot js n1ade a felony, and sec-
tion 262 of the cri1ninal proc.edure act gives to any 
defendant jointly indicted 'vith another or others, 
for a· felony, the right to a separate tria.J, if he 
requires it. All the defendants having waived this 
privilege and declared their election to be tried 
jointly, their defense 'v~ joint and not several, 
and no one of them had authority to control the 
con~uct of the defense." (Id. at 1 Pac. 656) 
F:rom 1878 until 1935, L~tah had a statute 1vhlch e·n-
titled. any person charged \V1 th a felony to a separate 
triaL Section 105~32-6 of the Revised Statutes of 1933 
read as follo-,.vs : 
~~\Vhen two o:r more defendants are jointly 
charged with a felony any defendant requiring it 
must be tried separately. In other cases the de-
fefldants jojntly charged 1nay be tried separately 
or jointly in the discretion of the court." 
See also Grim. Pra-c .. Act of J,>;·s) § :262~ p .. 116; C. L. 
§ 5038 {1888); 11.6 ... § 4850 (1898); G,. L. § 4850 ( 1 :;o7); 
C~L. § ~i980 ( 1917). · 
\Vhen a defendant had the right to demand a sepa-
ra~e·_triaJ, ~e provisions of. s~~tio:n 77-30-2 ,\-ere not o~ 
jection.able. If a joint. def ~nd~nt did. not agree ,\~i th. th~ 
.other defendants as to the exercise of the chal~e11:ges. ~Qen 
he could detnand a separate trial, and thus take advan-
tage of th_c. full number of chall~~ges allo,ved by sec~ion 
77-30~15. On l\Iarch 14~ 1935, se(~~ion 105~32-6 'vas ~Inend­
ed to read substantially the same as {/t.ah Code Ann. (~ 
77-3J-6 · (1953). .Fro1n tha_t tbne t111til the present date, 
n joint defendant has had no right to dernand a separate 
10 
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trial. A separate trial may only be gl'an ted in the di~tre~ 
tion of the trial judge. ''rhen there is no way in "-l1irh a 
defendant can as~ure himself of the full number of per-
r·nlptory ehallenges granted by section 77-30-.1 s, section 
77 ~.'}0-~ 1 requiring the challenges to be exercised jointly, 
becomes objectionable and unconstitutionaL 
In Ca-rro/.l -~;. S ta.tef 139 Fla .. 2:3~)~ 190 So .. 437 ( 1939), 
the court stated a~ follo,vs: 
~·t1 nder the Constitution of the U-nited States 
and the State of F~lorida the defendant in a crimi-
nal ca8e i~ guaranteed the right to a trial b)' an 
impartial jury and it is to effectuate this guaranty 
that he 1nay rejPr.t a certain nurnber of thoRe ~7ho 
are called to the jury box without. giving his 
reason for not 1vishing then1 to pass upon his guilt 
or innocence. By tl~i~ n1eans he may esr..ape the 
judg1nent of those ,,-hout he may consider preju-
dicial agaiilSt hin1 but 'vhom he may· not be able 
to ;sh(nv disqualified for causes defined by stat-
ute/~ (Id. at 190 So. 438) , 
See also ill eade r. ('I tate. H5 So. 2d 613 (Fla .. 1956) .. 
There are cases to the effect that peremptory chal~ 
lenges are 'Within the discretion of the legislature.· These 
cases hold that the rc is ·no constitutional 1·ig ht to a per-
emptory challenge RR contrasted with a challenge· for 
cause. Even if t hi~ view is taken, section 77-.10_,_·2 is un-
constitutional in that it denied the defendant the equal 
protection of the la\v. Co·u,'·d., n·n~e nd. XIV. 
Vlhen the legislature has provided for perf!..mptory 
ehall enges, as the t ~ tah I egisla ture has in section 77-JO-
11 
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1.5j rights every bit as real as these created hy the Con-
~titution come into beingr The lTtah legh;lature "\Vent 
J'ul"ther, hovlevcr, and in section 77-30-2 it restricted the 
rig-ht to peremptory challenges ''"'hieh a defendant tried 
jointly might have~ In other v.rordsJ section 77-30-2 dif~ 
ferentiutes bet\veen tvv-o types of defendants one of \vhich 
.i~ excluded fro1n the sub~tantive provisions of se(~.t.ion 
'17-30~15. The effect of this ~ection is to diserhuinate 
against any joint defendant ,,~ho cannot agree 'vith the 
others. Such discrimination is unreasonable and ar bi-
trary and renders sP.rt!on 77-80-2 unconstitutional. 
.In State v .. Jf ason, 94 T; tah 5011 78 P r2d 920 ( 1938), 
J u~~t.ice \~~l olfe set forth the proper standard -with which 
to detcrrnine the conHtitutionalit;.~ of an act 'vhich is ques-
tioned as denyin~ the equal protc~t1on of the Ja·ws. In 
doing so he 1nade the foil O\ving cornrncnts: 
"~~ denial of the 1 a'.\'~ equal IJ rotecti ou pre-
supposes an unreasonable di:.;(·.rim ina t.i on bet\re.en 
tl1ose included and those excluded from the act 
\vhether the act confers a privilege or a right or 
im}>oses a duty or an obligation. 
''Of course, every legislative act is in one 
sense discriminatory.. The legislature can not 1 egj s-
late as to all persons or all subject matters~ lt is 
inelns i ve a~ to sou! c <~la~~ or group a11 d a~ to some 
lnunan 1'elationRhips, tran~aetions, or functions 
rtnd exclusive a~ to the ren1ainder. For that 
reason, to be rmconstitu tional the discrimination 
1n11 ~ t be un r<._"'a~oua h l {_"' or ar bitrar~~~ ~:\. clas~ ifiea-
t i un is lH:ver u n reaHon a 1 de or a rh1 trar_\~ in its in-
cl u~ion or exclusion features so long as there is 
~n1ue basis for the differentiation bet,\-een classes 
12 
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or subject nlatt.ers in~luded as compared to tl1o~e 
excluded i"rotu it~ operation~ provided the differ~ 
cntiation bear~ a reasonable relation to the pur-
poses to be aerornplished hy the act. 
''It is only where son1e person::3 or .transac-
tions excl nded from the operation of the In\,. are 
as to the subject matter of the la\v in no djfferen-
tiable f·lass fro1n tho~.P ineluded in its operation 
that the la\f is discrirninatory in the ~e11~e of 
lH~ing arbitrary and uneonsli tutional.. If a reason-
able basis to diffetentiate those included fro1n 
those excluded from its operation can be found, it 
must be held constitutionaL" 
The legislature's purpose in enacting section ·77~30-15 
is obvious. The purpose behind section 77~30-2, \vhich 
restricts the operation of ;7 <~Y)-f .. -; in joint trial is not so 
clear. One purpose certainly "\vas to expcdjte the adn1in-
istration of justice~ Hovrever~ it seen1s clear that the 
legislature did not intend to limit a person charged \'{ith 
a felony to any nurnber of perernptory chaJlcngcs short 
of that set forth in 7iT30-1.5. rrlle lcgjslature in fact 
granted the joint defendant extra challenges \vh1el! <~ould 
be exercised separately, and of course if a joint defendant 
could not agree tl1en he had the right to demand a sepa-
rate trial. See page 10; Peo;)le r. O'Laughlin~ 3 Utah 
133, 1 Pac. 653 ( 1882). 
When t1te del~cndant. could no longer den1and a sepa-
rate trial~ it hecru n e po:;sible for section 77 -30~2 to pro-
duce a result contrary to the original legislative jrJtcnt 
Such a result 1vas achieved in the instant case. The de-
fendant failed to agree "·ith hls joint defendant, and thus 
13 
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·~vas excl~d~d froin the overat.'Lun of section 77-30-1:j a8 to 
its snhjeet matter, and" could exercise only the two extra 
perem"p_tor~es alloV,'ed under section 7"7-30-2. 
rrhe "fact that the defendant ,\~as tried jointly h:; not a 
reasonable differentiation as measured against the 6tand-
ard of f3t"ale v. Llla.son.. The differentiation has noth]ng 
to .. do \vith the crin1e 1vith \vhich he 'vas charged.- The rle. 
fe11dant had to make· his o"\vn defense, \vhich incidently 
\vas antagonistic to that of his joint defendant If the end 
res _u1t of the trial is adverse to the defend ant, then he 1\~ll 
have to pay for th-e crirae personally ju~t the same as if 
he llad been tried separately. 
. . . 
The differentiation is unreasonable in vic'v of the 
fact that th~ defendant cannot eontrol the c.1ass he is in. 
That is, 'vhether he is included in the operation of section 
/'7-30-1.~; or excluded hy virtue (d. sPt·ljoll 't7·30·:.! has 
nothing ·to do \vi th his O\vn intPI!t or pov.."'er. Of course 
he e·an agree-but if the a(~t is construed as forcing his 
·consent then it eeriainly diserhninates against ltim. ~i,he 
tria..l .~udgc ca11 remove the defendant from the operation 
c1f t:1ee1iu~i -~'7-30-2 hy granting a separate trial, but the 
defendant has no right to den1and such action. The depu-
ty COUJ1t)~-attorney ·,vho drafts the ~ffillplaint has" more 
eoritrol over· the class i.it which the defendant \vill be 
placed than any other person~· In fact in t~h; instant case~ 
one of the three persons in1plieated in the crime 'vas tried 
separa t i,_~ l y ~ \\' h i_l e the defendant Bo\vne 'vas tried jointly 
,vith anothe.1·. 
The purpose of expcc.1iene.\- 1~1 of c.ourse, still present; 
ho,vever, this is not. sufficient to justi [y the arbitrary· dit~ 
14 
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ferentiation of the act set forth. Expediency must be 
,reighed against our traditional guarantees of liberty ~d 
justiee. It is the duty of the court to protect the. people 
frout un·w·arranted inroads made in the guise of efficiency. 
'·Ve rightly have many safeguards surrounding a perso~ 
accnsed of the crime of rnurder. Such an individual 
~hould be tried \vith care. which correspo~ds with _the 
awful responsibility of t~ng human life to aton~ for 
+ 
crune. 
}~vPn ~~ith tllis purpose in mind it seems clear thal 
the legislators, in ·part, followed the purpose behind sC(~­
tion 77-80-16~ since they gave the defendants t\\ro extra 
challenges~ At the time the act was passed, this meant 
if the defendants agreed tl1cy 'vould get ten bet,veen them 
and t\\~o each separately or a total of fourteen. If they 
. . 
could not agree 1 then any· one of them could demand q 
separate trial and secure the full ten perem pto IJ~ chal-
lenges. Thus the dominant purpose \vas still to give the 
person charged jointly the benefit of any doubt. He 
could not get Jess than the number provided in the 
counterpart of section 77-30-15. 
In contrast to the instant situation, it is interesting 
to note that any challenge of uncon sti tuti onali ty bef or~ 
1933 \\·ould have to come from a defendant tried sepa-
rately on the grounds that one tried jointly could ~ecure 
additional perernptorles. Tn this situation the differen-
tiation would be reasonable 'vith the thought in nrind 
that the joint defendant ,v·ould have to agree on the ten 
challenges. 
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Certainly the statute ill qu{_~~tion i~ itn reasonable and 
arbitrary \vi thin the n1eaning of St.ute -r .. a! nso-n.. In the 
in~~ a.n t (!.ase it produeed a res u1 t \\' hich denied the defend-
ant of the equal protection of the la\vs. 1t i~ violative 
of both the Constitution of l;tah and the Constitution 
of the l~nited States.. Section 77-30-2 should be struck 
do\vn as unconstitutional.. 
POINT IL 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
NOT GRANTING DEFE~DA~T'S 1\fOTION FOR A SEPA-
RATE TRIAL. 
lJ t(lh Code A ·n nl § 11"-:t l-6 ( 1.053) ~ provides that \.v hen 
t \\·o or n1 o t·e del' end ants are ,jo i nll :: c.harged \v j th any 
o ffcnsc they shall be tried j o ill U y ~ "unless the court in its 
discretion . I I orders separate trials.'~ Se~ page 10 .. In 
the instant ease the del'endant moved for a separate tria] 
on tlu: ground, inter alia, that the defenses of the joint. 
defendants \vere antagonistic (R~ 2G-29, 34 and 35). 
1"~h:..~ trial judge denied this n1otion ( R~ :27- A)~ a1Jd 1n ~o 
doing abused hi6 discretion. 
Tl•e discretion entrusted to the court i~ a }1ulicial 
oneJ and rnay not be exercised arbitrarily. See People 
~~. L·-i·ndi~ay, ..f-l.~ IlL ~-72, 107 .:\'.E. ~d (1952); People v. 
Ba-rba.to~ 395 Ilt 264, 69 N.E·. ~d fi92 (19-!H); People t. 
Blaltnc, 363 IlL 551 J 2 :\J~:. ~d ~:-~9 (19:36); People t\ 
.t· 'i:-.:her, ~-f-9 X."'\'. -t 1 H, 1 G4 X .l 4~. ;~;~ ~) { 1928). If the order 
of the court U.ep t·tvcs the defendant of a fair trial, then 
! !1( ~ judge ha~ a Lu~c·d l1i.s d i ~r·r~ ·t ion. See People r. Jf in-
U('f'(:t. :Ht! IlL :l4l J 200 ?\.11:. 853 (1936); ]:Jeople v. Lindsay~ 
supra. 
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Then~ is littlE.· law in 1 ~tall concerning this question. 
In the ~·aH<~ of Sto t(~ (. 1lf i1fe-r, 111 Lftah 25~), 177 P. :2d 
7:27 { 1 D-1-7), t.lu~ defendants vtere jointly tried for rape. 
:\ 1notinn for separate trials 'vas made but no grounds 
\V"ere :;(·1 forth.. X o affidavit~ \\~Pre fil(·d, and the rer..ord 
fn iled to ~liO\\' that nny oral statement \vas made giving 
tltP l"Pa~OTl~ for the motion. rfhe l-:tah COUrt stated flS 
follo\r~: 
··The record of th ~~ (·fl~P, "\vhile it sho1vs tl1a1 
counsel J'or appellant Jufldl~ motions for separatP 
trials~ it also sho~'s that he did not 1nalu~ knovlr'n 
anY r(:a~on for his rnot.i on. There "\\:rerc no affi .. 
da~it~ filed a.nd the reeord fails to sho\v that nny 
oral st nte1nent giving the reasons 1vas n1ade. Since 
the appellant could not demand a ::;everance as a 
matter of right it n1ust appear that the court had 
before it trte fact~ \\'hich v,rould indicate that. the 
appellant \\~ou ld be unduly prejudiced by a joint 
trial before \Ve could hold that the tou r"i. had 
ahtlf-iPd its discretion.~' 
The l~tah r..ourt also decided the ca~e of /)fa.tr: t". 
Burke, 1 0:! Ctah 249, 1~9 P. ~d 560 (194:2)~ "\Vhieh involved 
joint defendnnt.s eharged \vith gaml1ling. The opinion 
does not dl~(·losc \vhether any ~ufficient shov,-ring \VflS 
made hr·J'ore the tr-ial judge in this case. The court held, 
ho\vever ~ that no all use of d1 f.!(·rr~tl on was found s i nee the 
evidence di:.;elo~{_\d the participation of both defendants in 
a cnntiuu iuy operation \Yll iel• 'va~ part of a busines8. 
The general rule is that separate trials should be 
granted ,,~here the defenses of the defendants are shu\\'11. 
to be an tagon is ti ('. 1 t. 1 f.; an abuse of discretion to deny n 
1notion hrr~cd on th j ~ ground '\:rhen a sufficient sho"\\.•i ng 
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is :made.- See l)eople v. BrauJie; 363 Ill. 551t 2 ::\+E, 2d 
839 (1936); Peopl~ n. R(j.~·e.~ 348 IlL 214, 180 N.E. 791 
( 1932); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E .. 2d 692 
(1946"); b"'fate ·r~ Livsey, 190 La .. 474~ 182 So. 576 (1938) .. 
In People v. Bratf.'rte, ~upra, t\vo doctors were tried 
jomtly for criminal abortion .. Each n~oved for a separate 
tria.I because of the antagonistic dcfen~c~+ The court 
stated·· a.S follovls: 
~'It was apparent frorn the petitions that an 
actual and s1l.bstantial hostility existed bet,vecn 
the defendants over their lines of defense. Each 
was protesting his innocence and condemning the 
other. Each declared the other 'vould take the 
'VI-ritness stand and testify to a state of facts wh1c.h 
v,rould b.c e x-c.ul pator y of the Vii tness. and condem~ 
natory of his codefendant. Criminations and re-
crimi.nations were the inevitable result. OrdjTJur-
i13.r the right of one def end.ant to cross-ex.an1ine 
his eodrn l'er1dant does not exist. l[o,vever, there 
is an exception to the ruler based on justice and 
necessity. '\\~here one defendant has given testi-
Jnon y 'v hich tends to inc rimj nate the othe:r de-
fendant, the latter~ e~peeia1ly \rhere he had no 
p.riur noti~e of such incriminating testimony~ may 
~ross-e;<anune the forn1er; but 've know uf no de~ 
cided case 1\7here such a situation har1 been brought 
· · to the attention of the con rt prior to the trial and 
a severanee w·a~ denied..'' 
In tln~ instaut ('ase,. one of the three defe~d~nts v-ras 
trie.d se})arateJ;.~. The ·defen!5es of tl1e t.\vo re1naining de-
-fendants "\~rere antagon~stic. C.ounsel for the defendant 
Bovln·e filed· an affidav1t to t1le efrcct that he had person~ 
ally interviewed the other joint defendant, and that this 
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~ le fendant assert(l( i a fact ~it nation '" ... hich was in~ons is t-
en t \vith the f:.t<·t~ ~<~ t forth l ~ \' Bo"\vne~ The affidavit al~o 
statPd that there \vas continued discord and differenr.P of 
opinion bet \\'PPn the attorneys for the respective defend-
ant~ {R. 28 and 29) I 
"There \\'ere also affidavits filed by associates of 
Bo\\~lle's attol'ney tc) the effect that on a specifie occasion 
the attorney fol· J{.ivenhurgh had advi~ed that th~ defense 
set forth hy his eli en t ··\\·as the only defense in [the] case 
and if [the~· J didn't go along \\rith him in that defense he 
'vould ntake first degree Inurders of ,Jessie M. Garcia~­
J r ~-- and Leonard ,.V .. arner BoVt~ne.'~ ( R. 34 and 35) ~ 
Tll e joint def en dan ts \\'Ct\.; unable to agree even n~ 
to the exercise of their perernptory challenges (T\ 64 and 
65 ). There Vr~as contin11al di6agreement throughout the 
trial. Because of the fear ¥lhich the defendant Bo'\\'lle 
held for his joint defendant, he in fact te~tified in an in-
consi8tent rnanner ( ~f\ 711-818) ~ This carne as a comp]ete 
surprise to his attorn(•y "~ho found it necessar~y to have 
the defendant recant and tell the truth on redirect ex-
amination ( T ~ 8.:26-843) I The effeet. on the jury of the 
defendant's inconsistent statements '\\ras not good. This 
prejudicial incident was the result. of the antagonisn1 
bet'\-?een the t,,~o defendants. 
The defendant claimed nothing as to the effect of the 
amphetimine pill~~ Vlhile this \va~ the crux of Riven-
burghts defense. The testimony of Dr. Clark ,\~as not 
material as to Bo"\Vlle (R. 405 et seq.). Yet this testimony 
was highly prejudicial, especial1y in vie\v of the long 
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hyiJothetieal c{uustions \Vhich were propounded hy the 
State (R. 418-423). These questions \Vere inaccurate in 
that they incorporated the test of sanity rather than 
•nerely consider1Tlg tlte difference bet\veen first. and 
seeond degree nturder~ They 1vere Lased on many facts 
\\o~hich 'vere not in evidence, and 'vere objected to on thjs 
ground (R~ 417). ~~·he questions .advanced all of the points 
\Vhiclt the State \vas attelnpt.ing to prove and amounted 
to a sun1mation in the 1niddle or the State's case. The ill 
effect of this testimony could have been avojded in a 
~c·parate trial, for it 'vas the direct result of the ineon~ 
sistent defenses of the t'vo joint defendants. 
Rivenburgh continued to take pills even during the 
triaL At one point it became obvious to 1nan·y present in 
the court room that Rivenburgh 1vas groggy (T" 906)" A 
n1otion to disntiss on behalf of Bo,\·ne hall been argued 
and denied~ The jury had been 1 n ~ t r·uc.ted, and ~tunma­
tion8 \\.~c:re about to beg i11. .l{.i ven burgh'~ condition was 
di~cussed in thatnlh':!'S ( T~ 800) on :F~riday, and a Te'!e~~ 
,\-as eall.ed until the nPxt Monday in order that R.1vel1-
1 nlrgh \voald be n1entally present at all stages of the 
proccc.~( i ing. .H~veryone having lrno,vledge of the t5 i tua t.ion 
\Y[I.~ a~hnonished and ordered to n1aintain seer(~e.y (T. 
906)~ 
It is difficult to assPs~ the effeet of this j nc.ident 
upon the jul·)·~ The jurors all had an opportunity to 
observe Riven burgh on Friday. They ·w·ere all present to 
notice the conrusion of n1any different persons entering 
and leaving tlle judge's chambers~ In spite of the adnton-
1 t ion, 1nan,\~ !'UJnors 'vere about The ne\vspapers i.Jnplied 
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that the reason for the delay 'vas the defendant\~ motion 
to di~1ni :-\~~ 
/\ no1 her consideration is that the jury ~ras instructed 
before ti1L~ inrident on _lPriday~ and did not receive the 
ea~t~ for deliberation until the follo"\ving )Jonday, three 
da)·::; later. The rather complierr1 (~d and tec.hni(·fll instruc-
t tuu~ 1nust. have been quite rentote in their 1n1nd~ at Hlat 
tiilH\ This intt(lt~nt had a prejudicial effect on the de~ 
fl·ndant Bu\\?Jle "\Yh ieh eonld have bc~n avoided in a sepa-
ratL\ trial. 
i\. grc~nt. deal of testimony, inadmis~ible a~ to t.he de~ 
fenda.nt, eanle into evidence as app1icahle to Rivenburgh. 
Rivenburgh had converRations ~'it}l the deeedent before 
entL\ring the attic (R .. 4H~) and again "\~·hi1c in the attic 
t R~ ~~,11) + He ~poke \Vi t.h Dalton as he ca.1nc do,\o·n from 
the ;d t1(• ( R. 513). Rivenburgh'R conversations \V1th 
Dripps relative to standing point (R. :t13), his state1nent 
t( • Stark t} 1 at there ''""a.f.;. a dead r nan in thr: a ttir, ( R .. 3()()), 
the incident bet.,vecn the decedent and Stark jn t.hP prP.s-
enee of Rivenburgh \VII<._~n the decedent expressed fpar 
th:tt he \vould be killed (R. 37 4 ), the conversat ]on~ \vit.h 
\\~nod~ concerning the boot8 ( R~ 4-57) anrl \vith .l~andcl 
and Ijandrun1 relative to alibi~ (I~-~ ~-68, 46;\ 3.11d 466) ~ 
all \\"Cl"e p rc.judicial to the dcfendan t BO\VTIC. rrh 18 preju-
di(•e could ha,Te been avoided by separ·atc trial~. 
The determination as to 1,~hether error 'vas cln1111n it-
ted mu~t be made in the light of tl~e faets \\~hich \Vere be-
fore t h L1 t r in 1 judge a 1 the time of the 1no l ion.. In State 
C. JJ if!cr1 S!lfH"a, this (~OlU"t said: 
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"Hov{ever the prc~ent case i~ decided upon 
the question of abuse of discretion \Vhich arisr.s~ 
jf at allr at tl1e time of the ruling upon the motion 
for separate trials4 It is not decided upon th ~ 
question of prejudieial error, assuming a proper 
motion.~' 
.. 
Bee .also People v4 Lindsay, 412 Ilt 4-72, 107 N.E. 2d 614 
{1952). -
In People r. l•·is!u?r, 2-1-9 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E4 336 
(1928), the appellate eourt took a rctro~pective vieVt,. of 
the trial in deter1nining \\' hether error had been com-
rnitted. In this connection the N e\\' York court stated; 
'' ['V{ e look to the tccord of the trial to deter-
mine if it] reveal[s] injusti{~e or in1pairment of 
substantial rights rmseen at the beginning. In a 
ease \vhere~ 1vithout the existence of a confession 
by one defendant, the evidence against another 
"rould be too \veak to justify a conviction or even 
where a conviction "\vonld be doubtful, our revievr 
of the judgment 'vould compel us to conclude that 
an abuse of discretion had been committed.~' 
If the determination is Inade on the basis of the cir-
cumstnnees present and before the judge at the time the 
motion 1vas made, there is error. The affidavits (R. 28~ 
29~ 34, and 35) and the ol'"al argument ('vhich \Vas not in-
cluded in the record) certainly indicated that the defenses 
of the t'ro defendants 'vere antagonistic. 
If the determination is made on the basis of the en-
tire record, the trial judge\~ order is equally erronous. 
~,he defendants could not agree as to i he exercise of their 
peremptories, and thus the defendant Bowne could exer-
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cise only t'vo such challenges~ See page 8 ; see also 
T. 64 and 65. The threats of the defendant Rivenburgh 
<~attsed the defendant Bo,vne to be inconsist-ent in setting 
forth his version of the facts (T. 711-818, 826-843). The 
defendant Rivenburgh, in effect, confessed durjng the 
trial virtually admitting all of the facts set forth by the 
state ·(R~ 513; T. 552, 553, 604-613). lie relied on the 
use of drugs as his defense. This de r ens e ~ras incon-
sistent to that of the defendant Bowne and prejudicial 
testimony, \vhich otherwise v.lould not have been entered, 
came in.. All of these incidents, together 'vith the long 
and mysterious recess which "'"'as called to allo'v Riven~ 
burgh to recover fro1n his drugged condition, were tJ~e 
result of the trial judge's error in denying the defend-
ant's motion for a separate triaL 
It might be argued that any B.Jlta.gonism bet,ven the 
joint defendants cou1d be overcome by proper adnloni-
tions or instruetions to the jury v.rhich would protect 
the interests of the joint defendants~ Such reasoning is 
false. In People V~ Bra.une, 363 111 551, 2 NrE. 2d S3R 
(1936), the trial judge did not hold the petitions ins u i' fi ~ 
cient to set forth antagonism, but rather inclieated that 
the interests of the defendants could be protected .. ~he 
court on appeal thought otherwise and so ruled. 
In People 1.\ Barbaro, 395 IH. 264t 69 N.I~~r. 2d 69~, 
696 { 1946), the court tnade the f ollo·w·ing s ta ten1ents : 
·· ... but the instruction could not cure the 
damage already done. Only theoretically did the 
instruction \Vithdra w the {_~Vidence from the con-
sideration of the jn ry. The prejudicial effect in~ 
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evitably rernained. 17pon the rceord 1nade, separa-
tion of the admissible {~V iden r-e fro1n the ~nadmiss­
ible becornes ahnost in1possible----even fo1· a t~ourt 
of rev.ie,v .. ' ' 
See also People r. F·i._~,·her, 2+0 X .. Y .. 419, 164 N.E. 336, 341 
( 1928) (dissent) ; People L\ 11' a-rgo, 149 ~lise. 4Gl, :268 
N.Y.S~ 400 ( 1.933). 
As 've have already mentioned, one result of the an-
tagoni8m in ih e instant case ,,~a~ to deny the def en dan t the 
full nmnber of peren1ptory clu1llenges he "\vould othenvise 
ex eteise. Such a result is certainly an element to be con-
sidered in det~.rrnining 'vhether error "\\ras conrrnitted 
by the trial j udgc.. See Ca-rroll -~_.-·. ~.).,lal e_t .1.39 Fla. 233, 190 
So~ 4B7 (1H39); j,_,Jeade v. ~.)lo.).f'~ 85 So. :Jd ()13 (~,la.1956) 
(question involved C.OIISolida iion of t\vo charges against 
<HI~.~ de fen dan t) ; People ·v.. l v· a. r go, 149 1\1 isc. 461 ~ 2 GS 
N.Y.S~ 400 ( 1933). 
"\Vhether or not the trial judge has abused his discre~ 
tion in refusing to grant a separate trial is a problen1 
11eculiar to each case~ Vrhetl1L·r fairness demands a sepa-
rate trial cannot be decided by any rule-of-thumb.. Sec 
People ·t/~ F·L··du;-r, 249 N~1 .... 419, lf)-t- N.E. 336 (1928) j 27 
... ~ustralian L.J. 238 (lH53). 
In People c~ Wa·rgoj 149 hli~c~ 461 ~ 2()S 1\" .l"".S. 400 
( 1933), a defendant cl1a1·ge< r \vi th nl urder moved for a 
separat.(~ triaL In considering the motion, the court ,~-as 
concerned 1vith tl1e folhn\'ing elemeni"B,: (1) The defensl\~ 
of the t'vo defendants \\·~ re antagonistic. ( 2) The moving 
defendant did not actually partiripate in the killing but 
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:1ided and abetted the other defendant. (:~) The other 
dPfendant had confessed. ( ~) rl,he di Htr·ict attorney had 
indicated that he t 11 ig h t call the other defendant (it iR not 
clear l1 n \V he "\Yould be able to do this). ( 5) The diffieu1t.y 
oi" instructing the jury as to the admissibility of evide!lce 
\va~ recognized. ( 6) ThP court also \Vas tnindful that, 
~ .. [ H] po u a joint. trial either defendant might easil~y-, in his 
01" l~t~r 0\Vll interest, deprive the Other Of all rig-lt t. to per-
l"'lllptOl"y challenge.~' 
The court in the TV.ltrgo case gran ted the In oti on for 
a separate triaL In so doing the judge ~tated as follo\vs: 
~~Even though there 1nay be basis ["or the con-
tention that no one of these reason~ i~ suffieient~ 
;.~et in the aggreg.ate they control the di s(·rction 
of a trial judge 1rvho8e pra~~t.ieal ex pL~rient~ ha~ 
\\·ttne~sed their soundness. They mini1nil'ie to al-
Ino~t nothing the popular demand for greater 
~peed~ econoJn~·, and convenience in the adtnini6-
tration of the la\v at the sacrifice of justice to the 
individual.. The trial of pett~y eases in the Sn-
ptente Court [a trial court in Xe1v York] can very 
w·cll j/ield sufficient tj •ne for separate trials in a 
proper ease such as this \vhieh ntust be classed aR 
the 11tost important of all Htigationt:: bcrause upon 
it~ outco1ue is dependent the guaranteed and in-
alienable right of human life." 
In the instant case each of the grounds which 've 
have discussed have on other oeeasiOTIS been deemed h.Y 
other courts sufficient to find an abuse of discretion. 
Certainly all of the6e elernents vic"tvud in the aggregate 
as Wargo suggest Po, indicate a.n abu~c of discre~ ion. 
The only \vay in ,\~hich tl1e defendant could havP been 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insured of a fair trial, was the granting of a separate 
one. 
In rnaking his deciHion, the trial judge was forced 
to \Veigh the interest of the co1nrnunity in speedy ~!J-d in~ 
expensive administration against our traditional guaran-
tees oi liberty and justice. Certainly \Ve should not sacri-
fice the rights of the individu~l for a little added effi~ 
ciency. rrhe 'vords of Justice Lehman in People v.l~~.;. .... 'her, 
249 N.Y .. 419, 164 N .E~ 337 (1928) (dissent), are applic-
able to the jnstant case. lie stated as folio\\-~~: 
'~X o considerations of expen6e to the 8tate, 
inconvenience to wi tr1e~~ :sL .. s and publje authorities, 
or even of delay in punishn1ent of the guilty can 
justify a proeodure which result~ in serious im-
pairrnent of the rightH Of an accused to a fair con-
sideration by an hnpartial jury of the competent 
testirnony produced against him. 
t'\Ve secure greater speed, economy, and con-
venience in the administration of tlle lav-r,. at the 
price of fundamental prineipleH of constitutional 
l ibert;~. That price is too high. Our ideal is that 
jus tl <.~t~ should be s1vi f t and certain~ Hum an jus-
t ice is still far f'rou1 that ideal ; and sometimes I 
feel that a proper zeal to destroy technicalities 
and achieve a more efficient administration of 
justice leads us to disregard fundamental prin-
ciples and guarantees .. ' ' 
In the int-:tant caHe the d-efendant '"a~ denied a fair 
trial. This could have been prevented Inerely by granting 
a separate trial. In vie"~ of the c ri1• 1 e \Y it h \,-hich the de-
fendant \va H charged, and the a \Vf ul punishn1ent which is 
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pr<.~~<·r1bed for that (·rhne; and in vh~,,- of the grounds 
'vith \rh ich he n1oved, and the un ['air tr·ial \vhich he was 
al·.tnally subjected to, a separate trial lnost certainly 
:-:.llould have been granted~ The failure to so order 'vas 
clearly an abu.sP. of discretion on the part of the trial 
judge .. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DE-
FENDANT~S MOTION TO DISMISS SIN·CE THE JURY 
COULD NOT HAVE FOUND BEYO~D A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE OEFENDA~T \VAS GUILTY OF 1\:lUR-
DER. 
In Instruction No. 8 the trial judge instructed the 
jury as follows : 
Hlf the evidence in the case i~ suscoptible of 
t.\vo construeti ons or jnterpretat.i on s each of which 
appears to you to be reaRonabJc and one of \vhich 
points to the guilt of the defendant and the other 
to his innocence,. it is your duty_, under the la\v., f.o 
adopt that interpretation which admits of the de-
fendant. 's innocence and reject that 1\'hich points 
to his guilt." 
That this is a proper instruction in Utah cannot be doubt-
ed. In State r~ I.JaufJ, 102 T;tah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942), 
this Court. stated as folloVt-~s: 
". . . the prosecution still has the burden of 
proving beyond a rea~onable doubt that the de~ 
fend ant is guilty. Or stated another "\\~ay, thG 
prosecution must 'not only sho~T • r r that. the 
alleged r a r.t~ and circumstances are true, but they 
must also be sueh facts and cireu1n~tances that 
are incompatible upon any reasonable hypothPsi~~ 
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lvith the innoeence of the accused, and ineapablc 
of explanation upon any rca~onable hypothe~i~ 
other than the defendant\;; ~ui I L ... ~all the r1 rcum-
stances af.; proved mur.=t be eonsistent \vith each 
other~ and they arc to 1Je taken together as proved. 
I~eing con8istent "-,..ith each other and taken to~ 
gether Un~.\- IllUSt point ~l1l'Cly and unerrjngly in 
the diree.t ion of guilt.~ 
''llPnceJ if t\vo reasonable hypothesiR at·{· 
pointed out by ihc evidence and one of tl1e1n points 
to tl1c defendant'f.! lnno-cen(~01 it 1vould then he dif-
ficu1 t. l n :-;ee ll O\V any jury r.oul d he convinr.ed l H_~. 
yond a reasonal.1lf.l doubt of the defenrlant's guilt.'' 
SeP. ai~o Stale -c+ A ndt'rson~ lOK "Ctah 130t 158 P. 2d 
.I :2"7 (1945); /3tale r+ T-1-u.-rch~ 100 t•tah ~-1-t, 115 P.2d 911 
(1941) ; State F~ (/ro~cfo-rd, 59 l·tah :-;9~ ~Ol Pa(·+ 1030 
( 19 21) ; People r. S co It, 10 l ~ tah ~ 1"7 7 ;3 7 P a. e. :)B 5 ( 1894) j 
State 1j. A' rivin.~ 101 1~ tal• 3G~lr 1~0 P .. 2d 285, B02 ( 1941). 
IT the evidence indicates a reasonable h:vpothcsis as 
to j nnote1H:e, the case should not be allo\ved to go to the 
jury. If the facts relied on by the StatP. are not inconsist-
ent \vlth defendant'~ innocence, the innocence of the de-
fendant i:-1 c~stabli~ ~ 1ed a~ a 1natter of laVt7 • See State ·r . 
.. J ude-r .. :·aJJ-~.j t:;Upt.a; Stu! e r. Er~rin, supra .. 
The State relied on the fae.t that Rivenburgh before 
entr-ri11g the attic disclosed a plan to kill the de_cedent. 
The decedent "~ct.~ killed in the attie and defendant ·was 
there at the time~ 
P'"rhe def~ndant adn1its tJ1a1 he heard 1-"ti.vcLrdJu q .. ~h dis-
(· lose a plan l o kill~ hut~ Hke 1lh" ~tate's \\·itn<.\~~e~~ did not 
be11eve Jiivenln1rgh \\·n~ sPriou:-;~ Bo\\~ne thought, H~ did 
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the ~ t .at~~·.~ 'vi t.ne~~e~.. t. hat l { iven bu r·p:h \vas going to the 
attie to co1nmit sodomy. 
It i8 rcn.=..·o1u1J)le to believe that Bo•Nne tl~ought. Riven-
bnr~h \\·a~ no1 going to kill the decedent but instead \vn.s 
going to cun11 u it HOdo1ny h~(·.a use of the follov"ing fact~ : 
1~ X eith(_~r the defendant nor the State's 'vitnesse~ 
thought Rivenburgh ''ras .-:;eriouH when he disc1osed a plan 
to kilJ. e.g. : 
{a) Dripps was told by Rivenburgh to stand point 
for sodo1ny ( R. 333). He 'vas not concerned \vhcn he 
heard tltP scream (R. 351), and did not think there had 
been a death. 
(h) Stark did not tlrink the decedent would be killed 
in spHe of' ,d1at he said as he "\Vas entering the attic. (R. 
;r;-+). 
(c) Rivenburgh did not tell "\ll oods of an intent to 
kill anyone \vhen he borrovled his bootR (R. 4;)7) ~ 
(d) Dripps told l{aslnussen to stand point but not 
~'"or rnurder (R. 332 and 334)4 
(e) Randel heard Riven h11rgh and the deeedent talk 
of the decedent's sex .ael ivitil·~ in tltc. attic the afternoon 
of the preceding day (R. 494 and 495). He heard Bo\'t'~ne 
~a~~ he ,v·ould have no part of killi11g the decedent ( r-r. 231 
and .:2-H-i). Buw11e told Randel he \Vas in the attic to sl and 
point for sodomy, and that he did not kno\v there "\vould 
be a killing (R. 269 ). J{;andel ~aid Bov~:rne 'vas framed (1{ .. 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
249 and 290). Rivenburgh· laughed 'vhen Randel said he 
'vonld have no part of the killing of the decedent .( rp~ 575). 
Randel never told the guards of any plan to kill the de-
. . . 
cedent bec.ause lle did ·not think Rivenburgh was serious 
( T ').:-14) .- .: . : . ._ . ~ . ~•. . 
(f) Dalton heard that" Rivenburgh was going to the 
attic to engage in sodomy .. (R. 319.and 827). · ·-
(g) Rivenburgh talked to the decedent about going 
to the attic for sodomy {R .. 498). lie first got the intent 
to kill th-e decedent 'vhile in the attic (R. 511)4 He had 
no intent to have Bo~11e aid, abet or assist in killing the 
decedent (T .. 6.:1-2)4 Rivenburgh had no knowledge as to 
the State's contention that Bo,vne had a SQ.issor lock on 
the decedent's head ( 1\ 644, and 645 ). 
(h) Garcia knew of no plan to kilL He was told 
to stand point for sodomy (R .. 503)4 
(i) Bowne did not think Rivenburgh was serious 
when he talked about killing the decedent (R. 267-278,296, 
297~ 497; T~ 691 and 692). He V~~a~ later told to go to the 
attic ~ith Garcia to stand point for sodomy (R. 269, 270, 
319, 503; T. 253, 584-586, 684 and 694). . .. 
2. It \vas cornrnon at the Prison to hear ·of plans to 
kill others (R .. 255). 
~3. It '\\7 RS comrn on to ll ear of threats to other in-
1nates (R. 276 and 278). 
4~ l t. 'vas comn1o n to stand point in the attic and 
el~ev,~J 1 P r·t~ for sodomy ( R. 279) .. 
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~,~ It ,,.af.i co Inmon to <"flrry knivf•s In tlte Prison. 
s(~(l pagt I ··L 
G. It was common to practice sodomy at the Prison. 
:--iPe l'a.ge 4. 
7.. The use of Amphetarnine pills v.ras common at 
t.he Prison. At 6:30 p.m., Rivenburgh \vas high on pills, 
and he talked about killing the decedent. No one thought 
hitn serious because of previous plans, threats, and ''big 
talk" induced by the pills. 
S. Other inmates who were witnesses for the State 
and who knew of Rivenburgh~s Hplan,." stood point, de-
stroyed evidence and ,ioined in alibis; yet they were 
charged 'vit h nothing .. 'rhey could not receive inununity 
for turning state's evidence~ Immunity can on_ly be af~ 
forded a defenda-nt and that requires court approvaL 
f/tah Code .A.nn~ § 77-81~7 (1953). The reason they were 
not charged along V.7 ith the defendantsj as as~erted by 
thl~ prosreuting attorney's office, was because the~y had 
no intent or kno\vledge that the deeedent \vas going to be 
killed .. rrhe reason they had no intent 'vas because they 
did not think Rivenburgh v.las t::erious. There is no reason 
\v hy l~o,vne should have thought 11 i ni serious~ It is ·reason.-
able to believe Bo\vne "'U8 there to stand pqint for 
sodomy .. 
l~~ven if 1 t i ~ reasonable to believe that a plan "\Va8 
effected: it is also reasonable to believe tl1at Bowne 'vas 
jn the att1c to stand point for sodomyr l!:ven if the facts 
relied on hy the State are consistent 'vitl1 the defendanes 
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guilt~ they do uot '". ~ .. exclude every reasonable hypo-
thesis other than the existence of such fact ... " State r. 
An{le·rso·n1 108 l~tah 1.30, 158 P.2d 127 (1945). 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO+ 15 IS CON-
FUSING AND IN ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SEPA-
RATE rrlfB CRIME OF SOD011Y FROJl THE CRIThlE OF 
1\.ICRDER, AND IN ITS ABSTRA·CT FORI\f COCLD ALLOW 
THE JL~RY TO FIND ITHE DEFENDA~T GUILTY OF 
:\-lURDER IF THEY BELIEVED liE AIDED AND ABETTED 
I~ THE ACT OF SODO~lY+ 
lnstruct.i on 1\ o .. l~) is the trial court's instructjon on 
'~aiding and abcttingH ( R-. 151 and 15~). It would not 
be o bjectionabl c if it 'vere not for the fact that in the 
instant case tnore than one cr1rne was involved .. l1uch 
of the testin1ony introduced in vo 1 ved tl1e crime of sodomy 
(T. 251, ~52, 609, and 610). 'l~hi8 crime \vas inextricably 
connected "With the fact si tnation. Sodomy~ the crime 
again~t nature, is capable of engendering deap seated 
prejudic.es against anyone connected with itr Indeed it 
mut='t have been dilficult for the jury in the instant case 
to appreciate the fact that no one 'vas being prosecuted 
for this act of perversion~ In vie\v of tlli8, it \vas error 
for the court to instruct as in T nstruction X O~ 15. 
In Instruction No. 15, the court fails to ~pecify 'vhich 
crhne it is speaking of. T·he Instruction read~ in part 
as follov.-,.s : '~ \'" ou are instructed that all person3 con-
e e rned in t.h e cotnmi s.si on of a c r i-1 ~ ~ e, 'vhe th er they d j ref t-
ly comtnit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet 
irJ its <:otrnnission~ are principals in any cri1n e so com-
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nutted.~~ {Emphasis added)· (R. 151). 'Vhen read in the 
cMtex.t. of the evidence~ the court literally seems to tell 
the jury that if the defendant \vas concerned in the com-
1n1~~ion of "a crhne~~ (the crinte of sodomy perhaps), then 
he i~ a principal in '~any crime" so coJnmitted (the crin1e 
of murder included). 
The defendant vlas charged only 'vith murder. It 
,\~a~ error not to 8pecil"y 'vhich c.rirno the jUTJT 'vas to con-
sider. The defendant adrrritted his part in the crime of 
~odotny. This, in fact, \vas his defense to the crime of 
murder. 1 et in Instruction No. 15, the trial .]udge failed 
to f;pr.ei t•y which crime th{_~ aiding and abetting of \Vould 
rende1· the defendant guilty. 'l1he jury, \vhile still under 
the impact of a sordid story of sexual perversion, vtas 
free ~ o consider the defendant's part in the sexual acti-
vities as acts capable of rendering hi Ill guilty on the 
charge of 1nnrder. If the jury chose to follov,' this in~ 
~truction, the l'act that the defendant t::tood point (look-
out) for an act of sodomy 'vas sufficient to rnakc hi1n a 
p ri nci pa 1 in the c.rhne of tn11rder. 
This Court ha.s exr•ressed it Rei [ o_n rnany occaRions 
In regard to the l1Se of abstract in~tructjont5~ See State v. 
Tho1n p.~rnl, 110 l~ tah 113~ 1 70 P. ~rl t;):~ ( 1946), and cases 
cited therein. Instruction X o. 15 is needle~ sly abstraet 
in failing to substitute the term "1nurder,, for the gen-
eral term .. ~crime .. ' ' In vie\v of t }t(.~ peru I iar far.t.~ of thjs 
ea sP~ the ~hoek i ng and highly distasteful facts involving 
~odon1y, the failure of the trial court to indicate that it 
\vas the aiding and abetting of n1urder and only· mnrde r 
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"'""hich 1vould make the d:ef endant a principal in the crime 
c-harged \vas great1y ·prejudiciaL 
~rhe prejudicial · nature· ·of this instructio.n \~,..as not 
cured bv a corrP(t state•nent of .the law elsewhere in the 
... .• . . 
instructi~ns. See Soda ·V. ~!ar-~i~o-tt, 118 Cal .. App. ~35, 
5 ~--~d 67;)~ 677 { 1~}31 )~ rr~li_s rule is especially tr_u~ in._a 
c:.r in1i:p.al case v..There. the . crinte ella rged is punishaple l)y 
deatli. The trial judge ·in his. i.nstruetions should take 
. . . - . . 
"s pee.ial care to remove any lna terial \\'hi c"h is erronous 
or unnecessarily abstract and ·thus p rej uilieial to the de-
fendant. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COCRT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 26 IS IN 
ERROR SINCE IT FAILS TO RESTRICT THE JURY TO A 
CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMISSIONS AND STIPULA-
TIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE TRIAL TO EACH 
RESPECTIVE PARTY .. 
·In Instrur.tion No. 26 the trial court instructed the 
jury as follo,vs: 
· "You must arrive at your decision .sole1y from 
the evidence sub1ni.tted to you during the trial, 
and the natural inferences which n1ay be reason-
ably d ra 'vn therefrorn, together 'vith the admis-
sions and sti p1tlati·o n s of the parties durmg the 
trial .. .. ..'' ( fJ1n phasis a.d d ed.) ( R.. 1.64). 
. -
The trial judge erred in not 'restricting the adtni8~ 
sions of a party to that part~y. Certai.nl~~ the admissions 
of one joint defendant ·cannot bind another. The error 
j s intensified if we ]nterpret the ternt ''party" to mean 
~~plain tiff" and ''defendant. !t' This is illustrative of the 
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rn j ~r }1 l PI' \\' h ir.h a rl ~P.~ ,vJten f\VO uef end antS arP. tried 
t o~PthPr in an improper ea~e. See page 16. 
In a joint trial~ the judge has the i1nportant responsi-
bilitY to t·r~~t rict evidence admissible on 1 y as to one of tla~ 
... . 
defendants to lhat defendant. This is the only ,\-a!·· in 
\\' hich the other defendant r..an be ·saved from p rejud i (~r~. 
:\~ 've pointed out in the argument to l31oi.nt IJ, the theory 
i ~ that any prejudice is retnoved by an admonition or in-
~t I' uet ion to the jury to forget what they have hP:a rd in 
regard to a certain defendant. See page 23. "\Vhile this 
i~ 'voefully inadequate and not realistic, it is certainly 
better than the instruction V{e no'v excGpt to .. Instruction 
r\ o. ~(}invites and commands the jury to consider the ad-
lui~~ ion~ and ~tipulations of thll narti~R in R.nv 'vay it seeg 
fit 
The defendant Rivenburgh in effect confessed during 
. -
the trial (R .. 513; T. 55:2<1 553, 604-613). The jury properly 
could consider his ad1nissions only as against hint. Sueh 
admissions '"ere prGjudicial to the defendant B ov,rne 
merel~· be~ause of their presenr.e in the trial. These ad-
rui~::;;ion~ should have been considered only as against 
the defendant Rivenburgh. The trial judge improperly 
instructed the jury to conHider "the adrnissions and stipu~ 
lations of the parties during the trial" and .did not re-
strict that consideration to the respective par·ty 'A'ho 
made the admission~ 
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POINT VL 
THE TRIAL .. JUDGE ERRED IN REFL1SING TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT~S REQUESTED I~STRUCTION NO. 13. 
Defendant~ requested in~truction No. 1:3 reads a.~ 
f ollo"\\,..S: 
"You are instructed that if after a considera-
tion of all of the evidenfP you conclude that it is 
reasonab1e to believe that tlu~ defendant Leonard 
''rarner Bruw·ne in1<~nded to stand point ·while 
defendant ~I.ar.k Jl ertill Riven berg ( sje) and the 
deceased Leroy .J n~epr1 \"!"erner mutually engag-ed 
in an act of f.;ndorny, and did not !nt.rnd to be a 
participant in an act of 1nurder, you should find 
the dcfcndan t Leonard \Varner Bo\\lJle ~·K ot 
(}ui l t;r. ~' (R.. 59). 
'thi~ in substance vlas defendant's defense~ He 'vent to 
tlle attic to function as a lookout during an act of perver-
sion. H c did not intend to kill, or to do great bodily harm 
to the decedent or anyone else. Ht· \\~a~ not a-.,vare of anv 
~ *' 
plan or intent on behalf of Rivenburghr If the jury 
thought it reasonable to believe the defendant~ then cer-
tain! y he \ras not guilty of Inurde r in the first degree .. 
Defendant had a right to have the jury in~trnc.ted 
as in } L i~ .reque~ted in~truction ~ ... o. 13. It -.;..vas prejudicial 
to hin1 not to hav(~ his theo1·y of defense before the jury .. 
Thi~ is especially so in viev..,.. of the instruction the court 
did g-ive in t.h e fonn of Inf.;trur~ t i ou No. 15 ( R. 151 and 
1 :l~). See page 32~ 
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POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A N!:\V TRIAL. 
~\ ne\v trial should have been granted for the follo\\}'~ 
ing r(·a~ons: 
1. ...\~su1uing that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in failing to grant the motion for .scpa1·ate 
trial~~ a ne-\v trial should have been granted after the 
trial hp(·ause of the prejudice ,vhic.h developed during tlte 
trial. s~~~ .. argun1ent for l )oint II, page 1ft 
'2. The jury \vas separated during its deliberations 
in that o~e bailiff took six juror~ at. a time do,vn an ele-
vator for pu rpo~es of going to the r·e~t room. This was 
brougl1t to t.l1e attention of the court. 
3. After ntany hours of deliberation, the C.Oltrt. in-
~trnel Pd the bailiff to adtnonish the jurors they 'vould 
be taken to a hotel fu [' the n lght.. rrhe fol'eman told the 
baili l'f that t hu ju1'y \Yn~ deadloeked~ ~\ t that n1oment, 
another juror askc·d for an additional fifteen minute~ de-
lihPration before leaving for the hotel. The jurors 1vere 
left to (.h.) liberate .. In ten minutes, at about 3:00 a.m.-
aftpr approximatel~,c nine ho11rs deljberation-they re-
turned 'Yith a verdict of guilty beyond a l'easonahle dou.ht 
(T~ 103G) ~ Thi8 indicate~ l hL~ verdict \vas reae.hed by 
means other than a fair •:xpre~~ion or opiuion h)- all the 
I JUrors. 
-t. The court erred in permitting the prosecuti.on 
to c.all tT es~iP Garcia to the \r [tnes~ st.and4 Garcia \\·a~ a 
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co-defendunt to be tried. separately at a later date (R. 
480)~ Counsel for Bowne wa~ also counsel for Gareia. 
. . 
1"\Then advised that the P~?seeutor intended to call G.arcia 
as a ·w·itness, counsel for Bo\vne and Garcia infortned 
~he.prosecution that he would not permit Garcia to testify 
in the Bo"\\'ll e trial ( 1-L 4 7 6) 4 The p rosecu tio:o. still ea 11 e d 
Garcia a.s a 'vitness i·n .. the pretN~Hce of the jury (R .. 475). 
Tl1~ jury 'vas exrused · while 1 a,,~ \vas argued and Garcia 
r.efuged to te~t.ify on 'thG g·roundH of self-incrimination. 
(R. 477 -479). 
~";-hen tl~~ j.ury returned, the court admonished the 
j nry a~ to 'vhy Garcia did not testify ( R. 480). ~rhe 
prosecution knev.r that Garcia would refuse, but called 
him ~nyv~·ay in. an effort to pr~judice the jury. The jury 
pro~ahly thought that Bo,vne and Rivenburgh v-."'ere guiltf 
since Bo"'~nc, R.Jven burgh and Garcia v.rere all charged 
\\:lth the sanle killing and Gareia V{Ould incrjminate hiin~ 
self hy testifying in the Bov.:ne~R.ivenburgh trial. The 
tnisconduct of the prosecutor \vas beyond the lirnits of 
propriPty and prejudicial to the defendant (R. 477). 
G. Rivenburgh \Vas questioned on direct examina~ 
tion by hi~ counsel; he \Vas cross~exan1ined by the prose-
cuti~n. qn matters touched on. direct. l!pon completion of 
the prosecution t ~ cross-exaniina ti on~ Rivenburgh "'"a~ 
rro~i-;-exan1ined by counsel for I!O\\:rne on matters t?uched 
on direr.t and adver~~ to the interests of I~o,vne .. Befor~ 
counsel ror Ilivenburgh \va~ IK~l·Jnitted to examine on re-
direct~ the eourt permitted the prosecut1 on to cross-
exrunine Rivenburgh on matt2I'.S touched on cross-
exainination by counsel for BO\\lle (T. 647 et seq.)~ 
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'Thr. procedure \Yns objt~et f~d to l1y counsel for Bo"\\~e 
on t h~· grounds that t t·o~s-exainiuation tnust be lintited to 
!nattPr~ touched on direct-examination and not permitted 
a8 to 1uatters touched on cross-examination (even though 
the cross-exantination \\-'as by counsel for a co-defendant) 
(1T. (i-t7 and 650) ~ 
The c.ourt erred in permitting the crus 8-exa1n i n.fl / ion. 
on the cro.~.)'·ffU nrtno ti u n) and ah:o, prejudic.ed the d~­
fendant by affording the prosecution undue repetition in 
having tv.ro cro ss-examin a ti ons. 
6.. X o motive \vas asserted or shown as far as 
Bovlne "'~as concerned. 'Phe absence of any proof as to 
motive tend~ to indicate innocence. See Peopl(j r. Torn 
lVoo, 181 CaL. 315, 184 Pac .. 389 ( 1919)4 )\There reliance 1s 
placed entirely on circun1stantia1 evidence to establish 
a crime:t absence of motive is a circun1stance tending to 
clear the accused. See Slater v. State~ ~2-t- Ind .. G27, 70 
K .. E. 2.d -J-:25 (19-:1-7). Presence or absence ot' rnotive is not 
proof of a substantive faet, though its absenee strength-
ens the presumption of innocence~ See Tho·inas u. G'~onnn .. ~ 
lS~ \-a~ 2(j;>, 46 S .. E. 2d 388 ( 1948). 
POINT VIII. 
TIIE. J'rRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO. COI\fPEL 
THE PROSECUTION TO FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS 
AND COPIES OF STATEI\IENTS )lADE BY WITNES'SES 
A~D DEFENDANTS. 
·The Prosecution \\-as .permitted~ while examining '\vit-
ne.~~es and defendants at trial, to refer to notes, content~ 
oi tape recordings and statements tal{en during the 
~tate ·s investigation of the facts. 
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·1,he full content~ of such documents should have 
been afforded counsel for -the defendant as argued in l1i~ 
~.'fotion For· Production of Docu1nents (R. 24 and 25). 
The prosecution had the ufair advantage of quoting 
''rord~ out of context.. This jeopardized counsel for the 
de i'endant in his cross~examination and re~direct. Qunt-
ing \von.1~ out of context is especially rmfair and preju-
dicial in the instant case because of the great an1ount 
0 f" Ci rc Ulll Stan tial evidence. 
In his cross-exmnination, the prosecution \Vas in a 
po8ition to in1press the jury that evecy"ihing he stated 
¥/as contained in the note~, tape recordings or state-
rnents, "\''lhen in fact it might never have been~ Because 
the 1rvi tn e:i s eoul d not ren1 ernber everything that '\\""as ~a 1d 
at a definite ti.rne and place nta11y 1nontl1s prior to trial, 
it \Vas iin plied t}la t he \VaS faJ SC]y testifying. rrhj S COUld 
have been cured by refreshing the witness's memory on 
re-direct. Without the proper documents, support 'vas 
irnpossi bJ c. 
An unfair and prejudicial advantage was afforded 
the prosecution hy the error committed by the trial court 
in failing to compel the production of documents as re-
quPst.ed in defendant's n1otion (R. ~4, 25~ and .27 -A). 
POINT IX .. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHEN IT REFUSED TO 
AD~IIT EVIDENCE CO~CERNING THE ~CHARACTER AND 
REPUTATIO~ OF THE DECEASED. 
A~ a general rule, the character and reputation of 
the dceeased is inadn1issible as being immaterial. Ho1rv~ 
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e\·~~r, it \Yas propPr evidence in the in~tant case for the 
purpose of showing 1 hnt it \vas reasonable to believe the 
dE·(·Pdent \va~ willingly going to the at1 ic to practice soda~ 
1ny 'vit lt Rivenburgh. 
Defendant <~.nntend8 he \Vas to Htand point in the 
attic while the der..edent and Rivenburgh engaged in 
,,odoniv. The State contends he wa~ there for rnurder4 
... 
( \Ht~ i~ t r·n t \vith t l ~e theory of other I'Casonable hypo-
thP~i~, evidenee of the rharaeter and reputation of the 
clp,·pased 8hould have been admitted to show the defend-
ant'~ conten1 ion 'vas reasonable. The trial court erred in 
refusing to ad tnit evidence of the decedent's character 
arui reputation for this purpose. 
COXCI~USION 
The defendant BovlnP }tas been denied the due 
process of lalr and the equal protection of the Ja,v~ \\··hich 
i~ guaranteed by our Constitutions. H.c has been deprived 
of a fair trial before an impartial jury .. The evidenee in 
this case did not warrant submission to the juiJT on the 
question of JJurder in the First Degree, and the defend~ 
ant~s conviction o~~ surh charge is not ~ubst.antiated by 
the evidence~ The trial and verdict eon~titute a miR-
carriage of justice and should be revers cd. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H1\N~LX _-\.~D l\1 TljTJEl~ 
(7ounsel for A ppPllrnJ.f Bo1c-ne 
-1-10 Empire Building 
Salt Lake {"1ity, l~tah 
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